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Abstract 
This study constructs an original data set of the population of all collective agreements which 
counted more than 500 employees and were signed in Quebec or Ontario during the period of 
1985-2007, to measure the incidence of an increase in payroll tax. Two alternative models of the 
incidence of an increase in payroll tax were used: one model separates the general from specific 
tax and express the tax variables in their level form, while the second model separates the 
general from specific tax but express the tax variables in rate of change. We use the Davidson-
MacKinnon test to see which model is a better specification of the relations in the data and we 
conclude that the tax variables should be expressed in level form. The results of this model show 
that that after one year, a one percentage point increase in the general payroll tax reduces wages 
growth by 1/2 of a percentage point in Quebec and 1/4 of a point in Ontario. The measured 
incidence for the general tax suggests the existence of a trade off between private earnings and 
social benefits financed with payroll taxes.  
 
 Résumé 
Cette étude construit une base de données originale de la population des conventions collectives 
comptant plus de 500 employés et qui furent signées au Québec ou en Ontario durant la période 
de 1985-2007, afin de mesurer l’effet d’une augmentation de taxe sur la masse salariale. Deux 
modèles ont été utilisés pour mesurer l’effet d’une augmentation de taxe sur la masse salariale : 
le premier modèle sépare les taxes générales et les taxes spécifiques en incorporant les taxes en 
niveau dans le modèle, tandis que le second modèle sépare les taxes générales et les taxes 
spécifiques en incorporant les taxes en taux de variation en pourcentage dans le modèle. Nous 
utilisons le test de Davidson-MacKinnon pour déterminer lequel des deux modèles est une 
meilleure spécification des relations dans les données, et nous concluons que les variables de 
taxation devraient être incorporées en niveau dans le modèle. Les résultats de ce modèle 
indiquent qu’après un an, une augmentation d’un point de pourcentage des taxes générales sur la 
masse salariale fait diminuer la croissance des salaires de 1/2 point de pourcentage au Québec et 
1/4 de point de pourcentage en Ontario. L’effet mesuré des taxes générales sur la masse salariale 
suggère l’existence d’un arbitrage entre les revenus privés et les bénéfices sociaux qui sont 
financés par les taxes sur la masse salariale. 
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Introduction 
 
In the OECD member countries there is a trend toward increase reliance on payroll taxes to 
finance social security programs; the unweighted average of payroll taxes as percentage of GDP 
among OECD countries was 4.9% in 19651 compared to 9.6% in 20062. In Canada the average 
of payroll taxes as percentage of GDP was 1.4% in 19653 compared to 4.9 in 20064. This raise 
some concerns about the actual impact of payroll taxes on wages and employment. It is known 
that payroll taxes increase the indirect costs of labour, but economists are still debating the 
reaction of employers to such taxes. It is important to understand the impact that payroll taxes 
have on employment because governments around the world could be attracted by the idea of 
financing their safety nets and other social programs with payroll taxes without knowing if this 
leads because of higher labour costs to fewer jobs or to lower wages with no negative impact on 
employment.  
The purpose of this study is to measure the incidence of payroll taxes on wages in order to 
further our understanding of this type of tax. This study constructs an original data set of the 
population of all collective agreements covering 500 employees or more that were signed in 
Quebec or Ontario during the 1985-2007 period. This data set has cross section and time series 
dimensions, which gives more variation in the payroll tax. Since the data set contains 
information on the population rather than a sample of the population, this study avoids random 
sample problems. Moreover the fact that the data follows different collective agreements 
explains the choice of the pooled regression method. This paper uses pooled regression to 
estimate two different models of wage determination equation, one model that distinguish 
general from firm-specific payroll tax and uses an help-wanted index to account for the variation 
in the labour demand, while the other model distinguish general from firm-specific payroll tax 
and uses the unemployment rate to account for the variation in the labour demand. The first wage 
                                                            
1 Lin, Z., Picot, G. And Beach, C. (1996). 
2 Statistiques des recettes publiques des pays membres de l'OCDE 1965-2007, OCDE, Paris 2008, Tables   
  14 and 39.             
3 Lin, Z., Picot, G. And Beach, C. (1996). 
4 Statistiques des recettes publiques des pays membres de l'OCDE 1965-2007, OCDE, Paris 2008, Tables   
  14 and 39.             
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equation regress the negotiated growth in base wage on general payroll tax, firm-specific payroll 
tax, the average annualized inflation two quarters before the collective agreement, a dichotomous 
variable to indicate the presence of a cost of living agreement in the collective agreement, an 
help-wanted index which proxy the unmet demand of labour and eighteen dichotomous variables 
to indicate the nineteen industries. The second wage equation uses the same control variables but 
uses the average unemployment rate observed two quarter before the collective agreement 
instead of the help-wanted index. 
This study is organized in three main sections. Section 1 explains the problems that arise when 
one tries to measure the incidence of a payroll tax and reviews the relevant literature on the 
incidence of payroll taxation. Section 2 presents the institutional background of payroll taxation 
in Canada, the data used in the study and the model. Section 3 analyzes the results of the 
estimations.  
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Section 1. Literature review and the adopted model. 
We begin with the presentation of the problem setting, which explains the problems that arise 
when one tries to measure the incidence of a payroll tax.  
1.1 The Problem Setting 
The marginal productivity theory is a sufficient but not necessary condition to show that 
employers’ payroll taxes are borne by workers. This classical view was stated by Harry G. 
Brown in 1924.5 In particular he argued that: “rationality and competition lead employers to hire 
workers until the point is reached where the wage is just barely recouped by the marginal value 
product and that if a tax is imposed on the employers in proportion to the labour hired, the 
marginal worker will no longer be hired unless he accepts a reduced wage which is lower by the 
amount of the tax”.6 If we make the assumption that wage are set under the marginal 
productivity theory, we can maximise the profit of a representative firm to derive the equilibrium 
wage after the payroll tax increase. Lets Max Pf(L,K) – (wL + rK + tL), where P is the product 
price, f(L,K) is the production function, w is the workers wage, r is the cost of capital and t is the 
employer payroll tax. The first order condition is Pf’L – w – t = 0, if we rearrange this condition 
to isolate the workers wage we have w = Pf’L – t, which shows that under marginal productivity 
theory, the tax is fully borne by the workers.   
The assumption of cost minimization is a less restrictive assumption than the one used above  
that can be used to derive the impact of an increase in the employer payroll tax.7 To satisfy this 
assumption, the ratio of marginal value product to factor cost must be equal, which means that if 
an employer payroll tax is added to the cost of labour, the employer will have to recoup the 
amount of the tax by either lowering wages, lowering employment or increasing its product 
price.  
                                                            
5 Brittain (1971, 113). 
6 Brittain (1971, 113). 
7 Brittain (1971, 114). 
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Another way to understand the effects of payroll taxes is to use a graphical exposition of the 
potential effects. Figure 1 shows a graphical exposition of the incidence of payroll tax. 8 
 
 
Fig 1 
 
The S0 slope represents the supply of labour by workers and the D0 slope represents the demand 
for labour by employers without taxation. When a payroll tax is levied on firms, the indirect 
costs of labour increase and the demand for labour by firms shift to D1, which imply that the 
equilibrium wage falls from W0 to W1 and the employment falls from E0 to E1. The difference 
between E0 and E1 is what economists call the disemployment effect of a payroll tax. The 
importance of this disemployment effect depends on the elasticity of demand and supply of 
labour.  
On the other hand, in Gruber (1997) it was argued that it is important to add the tax benefit 
linkage into the model in order to have a complete graphical exposition of the effect of a payroll 
tax. The argument is the following, “In the presence of such a linkage, workers are receiving 
higher net compensation than in the pure tax model, since the tax is buying them some benefits. 
Workers are therefore more willing to work harder for a given amount of money wage”.9 The 
                                                            
8 Figure 1 is based on the graphical exposition showed in Gruber (1997, S75). 
9 Gruber (1997, S76). 
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presence of tax benefit linkage can be modeled in figure 1 as a shift of the supply of labour from 
S0 to S1 which further lower the wage to W2 and also increase employment from E1 to E2. Thus 
the presence of tax benefit linkage reduces the disemployment effect of a payroll tax increase. 
However adding the benefit linkage in an empirical model is something that has never been 
done. This is due to the complexity of measuring the extent to which the benefits bought by the 
payroll tax are valued by the workers.10 The benefit linkage is not the only parameter that 
influences the efficiency cost of an increase in payroll tax in terms of jobs lost. In Gruber (1997) 
the author uses a mathematical derivation of the simple model that we used for our graphical 
exposition to show that full shifting can have three main distinct causes, an elastic demand, an 
inelastic supply or a full tax benefit linkage.11 Moreover, in Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990) it 
was also argued that the type of payroll tax either general or firm-specific influences the 
incidence of payroll taxes.12 The firm-specific taxes vary among different employers according 
to the level of risk of their industry and their firm. If we make the assumption of no benefit 
linkage, then an increase in firm-specific payroll tax lowers the demand of labour, shifting D0 to 
D1. But the need of a risk premium to compensate the workers for working in a riskier work 
environment moves the labour supply curve from S0 to S’1. Depending on the relative magnitude 
of the two effects, the equilibrium price W’2 can be lower, equal or above W0. Thus, the 
theoretical literature on the subject has identified four main parameters which highly influence 
the incidence of a payroll tax; an elastic demand of labour, an inelastic supply of labour, a full 
tax benefit linkage and the type of payroll tax, either general or firm specific. 
The simple graphical model that we used to illustrate the incidence of payroll taxation allowed us 
to highlight the main parameters which determine the magnitude of the backward shifting of an 
increase of payroll tax through lower wages or lower employment. However it is important to 
keep in mind that, as argued by Gruber (1997), this paper estimates a reduced form model which 
implies that if the estimation shows full shifting the model will not give any information about 
the structural cause of the measured incidence. Still, assessing correctly the actual incidence of 
payroll taxation would be a step forward in the direction of better economic policies. 
                                                            
10 See Appendix 6 for an analysis of the impact of an increase in payroll tax which distinguishes general tax with 
benefits from general tax without benefits. 
11 Gruber (1997, S77). 
12 Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990, 181). 
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1.2 Brittain (1971) 
The first econometric study on payroll taxation that we will review is by Brittain (1971). In that 
paper, the author tries to isolate quantitatively the impact of employer payroll taxes on factor 
shares in the long run. In order to measure the impact of payroll taxes, the author builds on the 
relationship between the compensation and productivity of labour, which has been empirically 
observed, and can be mathematically derived under certain assumptions, more precisely the 
specification of a production function.13 Based on these assumptions, the author conducts an 
inter-country analysis, which takes advantage of the wide variation in tax rates among the 
different countries.  
This study uses the ordinary least square method (OLS) to estimate a cross-sectional regression 
of aggregative data among different countries. The author argues that this approach gives the 
long-run incidence of a payroll tax on wages. The data on wages and employment come from 
manufacturing censuses for 1958, but the author also adds any other census in the period of 1957 
to 1959. The data set contains 64 countries and up to 12 different industries which gives a total 
of 407 observations. The effective tax rates were estimated from the statutory rates, which are set 
in each country by the government.  
This research uses a statistical model which is a variation of the estimating equation that emerges 
from the constant elasticity of substitution production function (CES). The author uses this 
statistical model to regress the log of the value-added per labour input in men-years on the 
variables wage and minus log of one and the tax rate. In order to avoid dependence on any 
assumption on the particular direction of this equation, the equations are fitted both ways.  
The author finds an incidence of -1.14 to -1.60 depending the equation used, namely when the 
dependent variable expressed as the log of wage, as the log of productivity, as the wage or the 
productivity. These coefficients are not significantly different from a coefficient of unity. 
Moreover, the author also estimates a pooled regression of all the industries which gives an 
incidence of -1.18. The main conclusion of the author is that for a given level of productivity in a 
                                                            
13 Brittain (1971, 111). 
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country, an increase in payroll taxes lowers mean nominal wages by the exact amount of the tax. 
Thus this study finds evidence of backward shifting of the payroll tax through lower wages for 
workers. This suggests that employers face a trade off between the employer payroll taxes and 
private compensation for their workers. 
1.3 Holmlund (1983) 
 
The next important study is Holmlund (1983). This study adopts a short term approach, tax 
lagged 1 year, to analyse the postwar incidence of the payroll tax increase on wages in Sweden. 
This study uses a data set in which wage rates refer to average hourly earnings for adult blue-
collar male who work in mining and manufacturing. The author constructs a new aggregate wage 
measure adjusted for inter-industry employment shifts and excluding overtime premiums. 
Moreover this study covers the period of 1949 to 1979. 
The author uses OLS and a two-stages least squares (2SLS) time series regression to measure the 
incidence of payroll taxes on wages. In particular, the author regresses in first difference the log 
of wages on log of 1 plus the payroll tax rate, log of 1 minus the average income tax rate for 
workers in mining and manufacturing, log index of volume of production in mining and 
manufacturing divided by the output trend, log of the current and lagged one year producer price 
index for industrial products (PPI and PPI-1) and the log of the consumer price index (CPI).  
According to the author, given the assumption of the absence of money illusion, there are good a 
priori reasons for allowing both output and consumer prices to enter the wage equation. The 
author argues that price of a product affects the wage of a worker even after we take account for 
the rate of change of the CPI. On the other hand, including both the product price and the CPI in 
the wage setting equation may create causality problems due to the possibility that the product 
price may determine the wage or that wage may determine the product price. Thus the author 
also estimates a 2SLS regression. In the 2SLS regression, the current PPI was instrumented by 
the exogenous variables of the wage equation, the change in indirect taxes, import prices, labour 
productivity, the money supply and change in the CPI lagged one year. 
This study measures an incidence of payroll taxation of -0.492 for the simple OLS regression and 
-0.462 for the 2SLS regression. Thus, the findings suggest that only a fraction of payroll tax 
increase were directly shifted back to workers as lower wages. However, these results rely on a 
12 
 
time span of 1 year which limits the measured incidence to the short-term effects of a payroll tax 
increase.  
As argued by the author, it is possible that the long-term incidence also falls on labour, despite 
the fact that the short-run analysis suggests partial backward shifting to workers as lower wages. 
Moreover, these results also suggest the presence of a significant incidence on employment in 
the short-run.  
1.4 Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990) 
The third study reviewed here is that of Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990) which draws on 
Marceau (1988)14. This study uses Canadian data to measure the incidence of general and 
specific payroll taxes. This study shows the importance of distinguishing general from specific 
payroll taxes, because these two types of taxes do not have the same effect on wages. Previous 
studies did not distinguish among these taxes, which one explanation for the wide range of 
estimate found in the previous literature. For reasons that we will explain in the next section, the 
model that was used in Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990) will be the model used in the paper. 
The study uses panel data for large (500 employees and over) individual collective agreements in 
Quebec as collected by Labour Canada during the period of 1975 to 1984. It is important to 
acknowledge the fact that the data does not necessarily follow the same collective agreements 
from one period to the other. The authors estimate a wage determination equation with the (OLS) 
pooled regression method. More precisely the authors regress the negotiated rate of growth in 
base wage on the rate of change of sum of the general payroll taxes and specific payroll taxes, 
the average vacancy rates, the rate of change of the consumer price index (CPI), a dichotomous 
variable which indicates the presence of a cost of living clause (COLA) in the collective 
agreement and several dichotomous variables for industries and a dichotomous variable to 
capture the effect of wage controls during that period.  
The variable vacancy is a proxy for the unmet demand of labour adjusted for the change in the 
size of the labour force. The variable COLA indicates the presence of indexation clauses in the 
                                                            
14 Marceau, N. (1988), Incidence à court terme sur les salaires de la croissance des taxes sur la masse salariale, M.  
    Sc. (Université de Montréal, Montréal, Québec). 
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collective agreement. The results of this research show that general taxes have a negative impact 
on the negotiated rate of growth of base wages, while the specific taxes have a positive impact.  
The paper finds that the rate of change in the sum of the general payroll taxes has an impact of -
0.247 or -0.0389 if the square of CPI and vacancies are used, while the rate of change in the 
firm-specific payroll tax has an impact of 0.0266 or 0.0260. The authors also tried to aggregate 
the two types of taxes, but the payroll tax coefficients are not significant. The main conclusion of 
this paper is that previous research on payroll taxes arrived to a wide range of estimates which 
sometime seemed incompatible because they did not distinguish general from firm-specific 
payroll tax.  
1.5 Gruber (1997) 
A more recent paper on the incidence of payroll taxation is Gruber (1997). This study takes 
advantage of Chile’s experience before and after the privatization of the social security system in 
1981 which led to an important exogenous reduction in the payroll tax burden on Chilean firms, 
to estimate the impact of payroll taxation. In other words, the author uses a natural experiment in 
order to measure the incidence or payroll taxation in Chile. This study uses data from a survey of 
all Chilean manufacturing plants which counted more than ten employees over the period of 
1979-1986. This data set contains information on total wages, employment, payroll taxes paid 
and a variable that indicates if a worker is a blue or a white collar worker. Moreover the author 
only uses the data for the years 1979, 1980, 1984 and 1985 in order to avoid the effects of the 
1982 recession which he argues may not be captured by the time dummies. 
The author creates payroll tax rates for each firm by dividing total tax payments by wages. The 
author also analyses the variation in the constructed tax rates to see if they reflect the true 
differences across firms in the underlying legislated costs of social insurance. The author 
estimates four different regressions to obtain the incidence of a increase in payroll tax on wages 
and he does the same for employment in order to see if the results of the wage equation are 
caused by a spurious relation between wages and payroll tax rates. The results of the basic 
difference pooled regression, in which the author regresses in first differences the dependant 
variable, either wages or employment, on the difference of the constructed tax rates, time 
dummies, dummy for workers group, finds that a 1 percentage point increase in payroll tax 
14 
 
reduces wages by 1.20 percentage points and has no significant effect on employment. The 
results for the difference-in-differences regression, which includes plant effects in the 
differenced regression finds that a 1 percentage point increase in payroll tax reduces wages by 
measures wages by 1,022 percentage points and has no significant effect on employment. The 
third regression is the basic differences regression where the difference of tax rates is 
instrumented by the other working class, the white collar had the difference of tax rates of the 
blue collar and vice versa. This regression finds that a 1 percentage point increase in payroll tax 
reduces wages by 1,412 and has no significant effect on employment. Finally, the author did a 
basic difference regression which uses area and industries as a grouping instrumental variable in 
order to correct the potential problem of spurious variation in the tax rate. This fourth regression 
estimated an incidence of -1,561 on wages and no significant effect on employment. 
The main conclusion of this research is that privatisation of Chile social insurance system, which 
led to an unprecedented reduction of payroll tax rates on firms, increased the wages by the 
amount of the tax and had no effect on employment. This suggests that if downward rigidities are 
not too important, an increase in the payroll tax rate reduces wages by the exact amount of the 
tax which suggests full backward-shifting. 
 
1.6 Kugler and Kugler (2008) 
 
Another recent study on the incidence of payroll taxes is Kugler and Kugler (2008). This paper 
uses a panel of manufacturing plants from Colombia to estimate how the rise in payroll tax rates 
over the 1980s and 1990s affected the wage and the employment of the Colombian workers.  
The author argues that the Colombian labour market is an interesting market to analyse the 
impact of payroll taxes, since payroll taxes in this country amount to approximately 40% of the 
payroll which is higher than European labour markets where taxes amount to 30% and North 
American labour markets were contributions are between 15% and 20%.15 The study uses a 
balanced panel of plants in the formal sector from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers in 
Colombia over the period 1982-1996. The data set contains information on total contributions, 
                                                            
15 Kugler and Kugler (2008, 3). 
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wages and employment. The authors constructed tax rates for each plant by dividing total 
contributions by the sum of all the wages.  
The authors control for sector specific trends as well as plant-specific trends by adding 
dichotomous variables for sectors and plant effects. They regress the difference of total wages 
per employees on the difference of the constructed tax rates, a dichotomous variable for 
production jobs and years, sector effects and plant effects. 
The results of this study without controlling for sector-specific effects suggest that a 1% increase 
in payroll tax rate reduces wages by 0,142% and employment by 0,273%. Controlling for sector 
specific trends gives larger effects on both wages and employment. In particular, the results 
suggest that a 1% increase in the payroll tax rate reduces wages by 0,187% and employment by 
0,305%. Finally the results with plant-specific trends suggest that a 1% increase in the payroll 
tax rate reduces wages by 0,235% and employment by 0,384%. Thus the results of this study 
suggest that only one fifth of the increase in taxes was shifted to workers as lower wages, which 
imply partial backward shifting. The authors argue that this “less-than-full-shifting” could be 
explained by the weak linkages between benefits and taxes and the downward wage rigidities 
which characterise the Colombian labour market. This could explain why unlike Kugler and 
Kugler (2008), Gruber (1997) found full shifting when he used the fall in payroll tax rate that 
followed the privatisation of Chile’s social insurance. This suggests the possibility that the 
incidence of an increase in payroll tax differs from the incidence of a decrease in payroll tax 
because of the downward wage rigidities that are present in most labour markets.
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Table 1  
Summary of the studies reviewed  
 
Author(s) and year Subject Variables Data Estimation Method Results
Brittain (1971) Econometric study of the incidence 
of payroll taxation an inter-country 
apporch.
Dependent variable:                                      
1) Value-added per labour input.                    
2) Wage.                                              
Independent variables:                                 
1)Wage and -Log(1+taxe).                              
2) Value-added per labour input and - 
log(1+taxe).                                                     
Dichotomous variables:                          
Industries.
The data on wages and employment come 
from manufacturing censuses for 1958, 
while some additional observations came 
from the 1957 and 1959 census.                   
The data set contains 407 observations on 
64 countries.                                                 
Payroll taxes:                                              
The effective tax rates were estimated from 
the statutory rates. The general and specific 
taxes were aggregated.                                  
This study uses the ordinary least 
square method (OLS) to estimate 
a cross-sectional regression of 
aggregative data among different 
countries. This approach gives 
the long-run incidence of a 
payroll tax on wages. 
Incidence of -1,14 to -1,60 which in 
not significantly different from a 
coefficient of unity. For a given level 
of productivity in a country, an 
increase in payroll taxes lowers mean 
wages for workers by the exact amount 
of the tax.                                               
(This study finds full Shifing).
Holmlund, B. (1983) This study adopts a short term 
approach, time span of 1 year, to 
analyse the postwar incidence of the  
payroll taxes increase on wages in 
Sweden.
Dependent variable:                                      
1) First difference of Log (wage).                    
Independent variables:                                 
Log of 1 + the payroll tax rate , log of 1 
minus the average income tax rate, log index 
of volume of production divided by the 
output trend, log of the current and lagged 
one year producer price index for industrial 
products (PPI and PPI-1) and the log of the 
consumer price index (CPI).                            
This study uses a data set in which wage 
rates refer to average hourly earnings for 
adult blue-collar male who work in mining 
and manufacturing. The author constructed 
a new aggregate wage measure adjusted for 
inter-industry employment shifts and 
excluding overtime premiums.                      
The number of observations in the data set 
is not available in the paper.                         
Payroll taxes:                                               
The general and specific taxes were 
aggregated. The statutory payroll tax rates 
were used.
1) OLS time series regression.       
2)2SLS time series regression 
where the current producer price 
index (PPI) was instrumented.
This study measures an incidence of 
payroll taxation of -0.492 for the 
simple OLS regression and -0.462 for 
the 2SLS regression.      Thus, the 
findings suggest that only a fraction of 
payroll tax increase were directly 
shifted back to workers as lower 
wages.                     (This study finds 
partial Shifing).                         
Vaillancourt and Marceau 
(1990)
This study uses Canadian panel data 
to measure the incidence of general 
and specific payroll taxes. 
Dependent variable:                                      
The negotiated rate of growth of base wages.  
Independent variables:                                 
The rate of change of general payroll taxes 
and specific payroll taxes, the average 
vacancy rates, the rate of change in the 
consumer price index (CPI).                            
Dichotomous variables:                                
A a dichotomous variable which indicates 
the presence of cost of living agreement 
clause (COLA), dichotomous variables for 
industries and a dichotomous variable for 
wage controls.
The study uses panel data for large (500 
employees and over) individual collective 
agreements in Quebec as collected by 
Labour Canada (1975-1984).                        
The data set contains 780 observations on 
the collective agreements signed in Quebec 
during the period.                                          
Payroll taxes:                                               
UI, Q.P.P, CNT, HSF, CSST.    The 
general and specific taxes were 
incorporated separetely in the model. They 
impute the average payroll tax rates based 
on the province and the sector of the 
business.
The authors estimate a wage
determination equation for the
province of Quebec with the
(OLS) pooled regression method. 
The general taxes had a negative
impact on the negotiated rate of
growth of base wages, while the
specific taxes had a positive impact.
Previous research on payroll taxes
arrived to a wide range of estimates,
which could be explain by the failure
of the previous studies to distinguish
general taxes from specific taxes.
(This study finds partial Shifing).  
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Gruber (1997) This study takes advantage of 
Chile’s experience before and after 
the privatization of its social 
security system which led to an 
important exogenous reduction in 
the payroll tax burden on Chilean 
firms, to estimate the impact of 
payroll taxation.
Dependent variable:                                      
1) First difference of Log (wage).                    
2) First difference of Log (employment).        
Independent variables:                                 
The difference of the constructed tax rates.     
Dichotomous variables:                                
Time dummies and  dummy for workers 
group.
Survey of all Chilean manufacturing plants 
which counted more than ten employees 
over the 1979-1986 period. This data set 
has information on total wages, 
employment and payroll taxes paid, 
information on blue and white collar 
workers.                                                        
The data set contains 6066 observations on 
the wages of Chilean firms.                          
Payroll taxes:                                               
The general and specific taxes were 
aggregated. They use firm-level data on 
total wage to construct the tax rates.             
1) Basic difference pooled 
regression (OLS).                           
2) Basic difference pooled 
regression with plant effect 
(OLS).                                            
3) Basic difference pooled 
regression with instrumental 
variable for group payroll taxe 
(IV).                                               
4) Basic difference pooled 
regression with area and 
industries as a grouping of 
instrumental variables (IV).
Results Reg 1) -1,20 on wages and no 
effect on employment.                           
Results Reg 2) -1,022 on wages and 
no effect on employment.                      
Results Reg 3) -1,412 on wages and 
no effect on employment.                      
Results Reg 4) -1,561 on wages and 
no effect on employment.                      
The privatisation of Chile social 
insurance system which led in a 
reduction of payroll tax rates on firms 
increased the wages by the amount of 
the tax and had no effect on 
employment.                                          
(This study finds full Shifing).  
Kugler and Kugler (2008) This paper uses a panel of 
manufacturing plants from 
Colombia to estimate how the rise in 
payroll tax rates over the 1980s and 
1990s affected wages and 
employment.
Dependent variable:                                      
The difference of total wages per employees.  
Independent variables:                           
The constructed tax rates (total wages / 
employees), sector effects and plant effects.   
Dichotomous variables:                                
Variable for production jobs and years.
The study uses a balanced panel of plants 
in the formal sector from the Annual 
Survey of Manufacturers in Colombia over 
the period 1982-1996. The data set 
contains information on total contributions, 
wages and employment.                                
The data set contains 470 observations on 
the wages of Colombian firms.                     
Payroll taxes:                                               
The general and specific taxes were 
aggregated. They use firm-level data on 
total wage to construct the tax rates.             
This study uses the ordinary least 
square panel regression method 
(OLS) to estimate a balanced 
panel regression in first 
differance.
Without controlling for sector-specific 
effects suggest that a 1% increase in 
payroll tax rate reduces wages by 
0,142% and employment by 0,273%. 
Controlling for sector specific trends 
gives larger effects on both wages and 
employment. The results suggest that a 
1% increase in the payroll tax rate 
reduces wages by 0,187% and 
employment by 0,305%. With plant-
specific trends result suggest that a 1% 
increase in the payroll tax rate reduces 
wages by 0,235% and employment by 
0,384%.                                 (This 
study finds partial Shifing).  
 
Sources:  
-Brittain, J.A. (1971), “The Incidence of Social Security Payroll Taxes”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 61, No. 1, pp.110-125. 
-Holmlund, B. (1983), “Payroll Taxes and Wage Inflation: The Swedish Experience”, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 85, No. 1, pp.1-15. 
-Vaillancourt, F. and Marceau, N. (1990), “Do general and firm-specific employer payroll taxes have the same incidence? Theory and evidence”, Economics    
  Letters, No. 34, pp. 175-181.Gruber, J. (1997), “The Incidence of Payroll Taxation: Evidence from Chile”, Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp.   
  S72-S101. 
-Gruber, J. (1997), “The Incidence of Payroll Taxation: Evidence from Chile”, Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. S72-S101. 
-Krugler, A. and Krugler, M (2008), “Labour Market Effects of Payroll Taxes In Developing Countries: Evidence From Colombia”, NBER, Working Paper 
 13855.  
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Section 2. Institutional background, data description and the model. 
 
In this section the data used in the estimations will be described and summarized. Before we begin the 
presentation of the data set and the variables used in the model, we will examine the 
Canadian institutional background under which the federal government and provincial 
governments levy payroll taxes. This exercise will give us a better understanding of the 
rather complex structure under which payroll taxes are levied. 
2.1 Institutional background. 
In Canada there are seven different payroll taxes, namely the unemployment insurance or 
employment insurance (UI/EI), the Canada/Québec pension plan (CPP/QPP), the workers 
compensation (WC/CSST), the Health and education (HE/HSF), the labour standards 
(CNT) in Québec, the employer training tax and the Quebec parental insurance plan 
(QPIP). The UI and CPP are the two payroll taxes raised by the federal government, 
excepting the case of Quebec which is the only province where a different pension plan is 
administered by the government of Quebec; the Quebec pension plan. WC is raised by all 
provincial governments, a province specific HE is only raised in Quebec, Manitoba, 
Ontario and Newfoundland. These seven payroll taxes can be divided into general and 
firm-specific payroll taxes. In Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990), the authors provided 
appropriate definitions of these two types of payroll taxes and this is why we use the 
same definitions. 16 
The general payroll taxes are levied on employers at a uniform rate and do not depend on 
the behaviour of the employers. The UI, CPP, QPP, HE, CNT and QPIP are the payroll 
taxes that fall under this category. On the other hand, the firm-specific payroll taxes are 
not levied at uniform rate but vary between employers according to the behaviour of the 
employer or their industry. The WC/CSST and the employer training tax are the payroll 
taxes that fall into this category. 
                                                            
16 Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990, 176). 
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Now that we have presented the payroll taxes and discussed the two labels under which 
they can be classified, we will briefly explain how the level of these payroll taxes are set 
and we will also explain the purpose for which they are collected. 
Unemployment Insurance17 
The unemployment insurance system is self-financing but sometime generates a surplus. 
The premium rate is set each year using a statutory rate as a benchmark. Both employer 
and employee UI premiums are charged on all earnings up to a ceiling. The employers 
pay 1.4 times the rate of the employees. This tax finances the Canadian unemployment 
insurance program which provides temporary financial assistance for unemployed 
Canadians. 
Canada/Quebec Pension plan18 
The Canada pension plan contribution rate is based on an actuarial review carried out 
every five years by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions. The Quebec 
pension plan (QPP) contribution rate is based on the actuarial report of the QPP. The 
employees pay a contribution rate which is equal to the contribution rate of the 
employees. This tax finances a pension plan that protects the contributor and his family 
against the loss of income due to retirement, disability and death.  
Workers’ Compensation Premiums19 
Employers pay the provincial workers compensation premiums to finance the workers 
compensation board of the province in which their employees work. The workers 
compensation systems are based on industry classifications with different collective 
liability assessment and varying degrees of firm-level experience rating, which means 
                                                            
17 http://www.servicecanada.gc.ca/eng/ei/menu/eihome.shtml 
18 http://www.rhdcc-hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/isp/cpp/cpptoc.shtml and      
   http://www.rrq.gouv.qc.ca/en/programmes/regime_rentes/ 
19http://www.csst.qc.ca/portail/en/ and http://www.wsib.on.ca/wsib/wsibsite.nsf/public/home_e 
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that the premium rates paid by employers vary according to the risk workers incur of 
work injuries.20 
Health and Education21 
 
This payroll taxes is levied on employers in order to finance nominally at least the health 
care and post-secondary education systems in the four provinces which use this payroll 
tax, namely Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and Newfoundland and Labrador. The level of 
this tax is set by the government in the budget. 
Labour Standards22 
This payroll tax is only levied in Quebec, and is used to finance the commission of labour 
standards which promotes fair and balanced labour relations between employers and 
employees. The level of this tax is set by the government of Quebec in the budget. 
Quebec Parental Insurance Plan23 
 
This payroll tax is only levied in Quebec, and is used to finance the QPIP plan which 
gives benefits to an employee who takes a maternity, paternity, adoption or parental 
leave. The level of this tax is set by the government of Quebec. its implementation was 
accompanied by a drop in the EI rate in Québec as this replaced the EI maternity benefits 
Employer training tax24 
 
The employer training tax is only levied by the government of Quebec on employers who 
neglect to provide training opportunities for their workers, which must exceed 1% of the 
total payroll of the employees in order to avoid the tax. The government uses this tax as 
an incentive to encourage employers to invest in the training of their employees. 
Employers with payroll in Quebec of less than $1 million are not subject to the employer 
training tax. 
                                                            
20 Bédard (1998, 19). 
21 http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/entreprise/retenues/cotisations/sante.asp and  
    http://www.rev.gov.on.ca/english/guides/eht/2436.html 
22 http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/fr/entreprise/retenues/cotisations/finance.asp 
23 http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/entreprise/retenues/cotisations/rqap_employeur.asp 
24 http://www.formulaire.gouv.qc.ca/cgi/affiche_doc.cgi?dossier=1087&table=0 
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Table 2 provides a summary of the seven different payroll taxes used in Canada.25  
Table 2 
 
Payroll Taxes in Canada 
Type of Tax Government Authority Contributor Rate (%) 
2007      
QC 
Rate (%) 
2007      
ON 
Unemployment 
Insurance(UI) 
Federal Government 
(1940) 
58% Employers and 
42% Employees 2.04 2,52 
Canada/Quebec Pension 
Plan (C/QPP) 
Federal and Quebec 
(1966) 
50% Employers and 
50% Employees 4,95 4,95 
Workers Compensation        
(WC ou CSST) 
All Provinces (1910) 100% Employers 
2,24 2,26 
Health-Education Payroll 
Taxes (H/E) 
Quebec (1970), Manitoba 
(1982), Newfoudland 
(1990), Ontario (1990) 
100% Employers 
4,26 1,95 
Labour Standards (CNT) Quebec (1979) 100% Employers 0,08 0,00 
Quebec Parental Insurance 
Plan (QPIP) 
Quebec (2006) 58% Employers and 
42% Employees 0,583 0,00 
Employer Training Tax Quebec (1995) 100% Employers 1,00 0,00 
Source: Bédard, M. (1998), “A Primer on Payroll Taxes in Canada”, Applied Research Branch  
Strategic Policy Human Resources Development Canada, R-98-7E, p10. 
 
In this section, we have examined the institutional background of payroll taxation in 
Canada, this allowed us to distinguish the seven different payroll taxes and see which 
taxes were general payroll taxes or firm-specific taxes. Moreover, this section also 
discussed how different levels of government set the rates of taxes and the different 
purposes for which these taxes are collected.  
2.2 The data 
The main purpose of this paper is to estimate the incidence of payroll taxation on wages. 
Thus, in order to measure this incidence we must find data on wages, the dependant 
variable in the wage equation.  Four different sources of data were examined in order to 
use the best data set available to measure the incidence of payroll taxation in Canada. The 
                                                            
25 Bédard (1998, 10). 
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first potential source was the monthly average of the weekly salary for workers by 
provinces and industrial sectors. The second source was the annual earnings for workers 
by provinces, age, sex and education. The third potential source was the hourly wage 
earned by workers, by province and industrial sectors. Finally the chosen source for the 
dependant variables was the negotiated rate of wage growth for large collective 
agreements, which counted more than 500 employees. This source of data was preferred 
to the three other potential sources because this source covers a large time span of 29 
years and has observations on the entire population of interest. Moreover, industries were 
classified with a standardized code and the results obtained with this data could be 
compared to the results obtained in Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990) for Québec for the 
1975-1984 period. 
The data consist of all collective agreements with more than 500 employees, which were 
signed in Quebec or Ontario during the period of 1985 to 2007, which is the period 
following the data used in Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990). The data set contains the 
entire population of collective agreements with more than 500 employees for the period 
of 1985 to 2007. The fact that we have data on the population rather than a sample drawn 
from the population allows us to avoid the issues due to non random sampling, missing 
data and selection problem. 
The data on the collective agreements were collected by Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada. The data on the UI, CPP, HE, CNT and QPIP were collected from 
published sources.26 The workers compensation premiums of Quebec and Ontario were 
provided by the CSST and WSIB, where the former is the workers compensation board of 
Quebec and the latter is the workers compensation board of Ontario. These premiums 
were defined for narrow industrial groupings, whose definition had changed for some 
industries during the period analysed. Discussions with the CSST and WSIB permitted 
the aggregation of the six digits industrial grouping, in order to be able to match these 
groupings with the three digits grouping of the wage variable. For further information on 
the data provided by the CSST and WSIB, please see appendix 1. 
                                                            
26 Treff and Perry (1985-2007). 
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The data on the collective agreements were merged together in a single data set, the 
payroll taxes variables and the economic cycle variables were added later in order to 
construct an original data set. 
Graph 1 
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In Graph 1 above, we can see the evolution of the total payroll taxes in Quebec and in 
Ontario for a period of time of 29 years. The total payroll taxes were calculated by the 
addition of the employer UI, CPP, HE, CNT, QPIP rates and an unweighted mean of the 
workers compensation premium rate, which means that the total employer payroll taxes 
may be higher or lower for some industries. This table show an increasing trend in the 
total employer payroll taxes and in this paper we will exploit this variation in order to 
measure the incidence of employer payroll taxation on the negotiated wage growth of 
unionized firm who counted more than 500 employees during this period. 
2.3 The model and the variables 
The model used in this research is the standard wage equation augmented by the tax 
variables, which was used in Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990).27 In this paper we 
estimate one equation which is identical to the one used in Vaillancourt and Marceau 
                                                            
27 Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990, 178). 
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(1990) and a second equation which uses the variable unemployment instead of the 
variable vacancies. More precisely, the first equation estimated is; 
Wi = β0 + β1GPTi + β2FSPTji + β3CPIi + β4COLA + β5vacancies + Σj=6 βjIndustryi. 
(equation 1) 
In this equation W is the negotiated rate of growth of base wages, annualized. The tax 
variable GPT refers to general payroll tax and regroups the sum of the UI, CPP, HE, CNT 
and QPIP. The second tax variable FSPT refers to firm-specific payroll taxes and is equal 
to the workers compensation premium, the FSPT varies between provinces, industries 
and time. The employer training tax was excluded from the analysis conducted in this 
paper for two main reasons. First, the employer training tax can be avoided by investing 
1% of the total payroll in employee training and thus is rarely paid by employers. As an 
example, 91% of the employers which were subject to this tax in the period of 2000-2003 
invested in employees training, 76% of the employers who invested in employee training 
invested more than 1% while 15% invested less than 1%.28 Secondly, there is no known 
Canadian data which contains the employer training tax information for a large enough 
sample of firm. The second equation that is estimated is; 
Wi = β0 + β1GPTi + β2FSPTji + β3CPIi + β4COLA + β5Unemploymenti + Σj=6 
βjIndustryi. (equation 2) 
We will consider two possibilities, namely to express the GPT and the FSPT in their level 
form or in rate of change. The variable CPI is the average annual inflation observed two 
quarters before the collective agreement was signed. The variable COLA indicates the 
presence of an indexation clause in the collective agreement. The variable vacancies is 
the help-wanted index produced by Statistics Canada, this index measures the change in 
the demand for labour, is a proxy measure for unmet labour demand and is an indicator of 
the near-term direction of the labour market.29 The variable vacancies was only available 
for the years 1985 to 2003, thus the estimation of equation 1 were restricted to that period 
in order to have a variable that captures the variation in the short-term demand of labour. 
                                                            
28 http://emploiquebec.net/publications/pdf/00_fnfmo_rapport20002005.pdf 
29 This variable was also adjusted for the change in the size of the labour force (see Appendix). For further  
    information on this variable, can be found on the Statistics Canada web site (CANSIM 277-0002). 
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The help-wanted index was terminated in April 2003, because many users expressed 
concern over its performance, especially in light of the growing use of the Internet by 
employers as a means of posting job openings.30 Given the fact that the help-wanted 
index was terminated, the variable unemployment can be use as a proxy for the unmet 
labour demand instead of the help-wanted index. 
The variable unemployment is the average unemployment rate two quarters before the 
collective agreement. In order to compare the results with those obtained in Vaillancourt 
and Marceau (1990), the model is also modified to include the square of the variables 
CPI, vacancies and unemployment. The variable Industry represents the eighteen 
industrial dichotomous variables. Food and beverages is the reference industry, the 
excluded industry in the regressions. The industries are: I2: construction; I3: textile, 
clothing and leather; I4: wood products, paper and printing; I5: petroleum, coal and 
chemical products; I6: plastics and rubber products; I7: non-metallic mineral products; I8: 
primary metals; I9: metal products; I10: machinery; I11: computer and electronic; I12: 
electrical equipment and appliances; I13: transportation equipment; I14: wholesaler and 
distributors; I15: grocery stores; I16: transports; I17: broadcasting and 
telecommunications; I18: administrative and support services; I19: accommodation 
services. Graph 2 compares the evolution of the negotiated wage growth for the collective 
agreements with cost of living agreements and the collective agreements without cost of 
living clauses.  
                                                            
30 http://www.statcan.gc.ca/cgi- bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=2606&lang=en&db  
    =8&dis=2 
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Graph 2 
 
 
As we can see the negotiated wage growth is generally higher for the collective 
agreements without cost of living clauses. Moreover we can see that the 1990s oil price 
shock which increased inflation also increased the negotiated wage growth. Graph 3 
shows the evolution of the inflation and the unemployment in Quebec and Ontario. The 
inflation and unemployment variables used in this graphic are respectively the average 
inflation in the consumer price index and the unemployment rate, both 2 quarters before 
the collective agreement. Looking at Graph 3, one can see that inflation is at its highest 
peak after the petroleum shock of the beginning of 1990, this shock led to the 1990s 
Canadian recession. Moreover if we look at Graph 3, we can see that the unemployment 
started to increase during the beginning of the year 1991 up to the 1992 peak. This is not 
surprising because the labour market variable such as the unemployment rate, tend to 
slowly react to economic shocks. 
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Graph 331 
 
Before we continue to the method and the results section, we will state the predicted 
relation and the sign of the coefficient of the variables described in this section. The 
predictions are based on the economic theory of payroll taxation, which was briefly 
summarized in the section 1. We  expect the negotiated rate of growth in wage to: 
decrease with an increase in general payroll tax (β1  0); decrease or increase with an 
increase in firm-specific payroll taxes (β2  0 or β2  0); increase with an increase in 
                                                            
31 The Graphic 3 is based on the following two sources: 
1) Statistics Canada (2009), Labour force survey estimates (LFS), by sex and detailed age group, 
unadjusted for seasonality, monthly (persons unless otherwise noted), 1985-2003, Unemployment 
rate and the labour force, Quebec and Ontario, Table 282-0001. 
2) Statistics Canada (2009), Consumer price index (CPI), 2005 basket, monthly (2002=100  
unless otherwise noted), 1985-2007, Quebec and Ontario, Table 326-0020. 
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prices as measured by the average annual inflation of the two previous quarters (β3  0); 
decrease with the presence of a COLA clause (β4 < 0); increase with an increase in the 
index of vacancies (β5  0); decrease with an increase in the unemployment rate (β5’  
0); vary between industry because of change in the output price or the capital / labour 
ratio32(βji  0 or βji  0, j=7,...,24). The goal of this paper is to measure the incidence of 
an increase in payroll tax on wage growth, thus we are interested in testing the 
coefficients β1 and β2 are different from zero. In other words we want to test H0: β1 = 0, 
H1: β1≠ 0, and we also want to test H0: β2 = 0, H1: β2≠ 0. 
Section 3. Method and results. 
In section 3, we explained the institutional background of payroll taxation in Canada and 
we presented the model, the data used and the variables. Thus, it is now the time to turn 
our attention on the method that is used to measure the incidence of payroll taxation.  
3.1 The method 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the negotiated growth in base wage, the dependent 
variable comes from all collective agreements that were signed between 1985 and 2007. 
Since we have data on the entire population rather than a sample, the results obtained will 
be representative of the population of interest and will be free from potential non-random 
sample problems and selection problems. Moreover, the constructed data set has both a 
cross section and time series dimensions. Given a province, the cross section dimension 
exploits the variation among the different collective agreements, while the time series 
dimensions exploits the variation among the period studied. This has important 
implications concerning the assumptions needed to measure the incidence of payroll 
taxation. In particular, this means that we do not have to make the assumption that the 
incidence is the same among the different collective agreements, as would be the case in 
a pure time series data set. In other words, the constructed data set is a panel data set of 
the population of collective agreements which counted more than 500 employees and 
were signed between the years 1985 to 2007. Because this panel data set follows different 
collective agreements through time, it is not possible to use the advanced panel data 
                                                            
32 Vaillancourt et Marceau (1990, 179). 
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methods, which use fixed effects or random effects. The collective agreements are among 
the same nineteen industries during the period, but they do not necessarily pertain to the 
same firm. Given the fact that the data set used in this paper is not following the same 
units through time and that there is no other Canadian source which follows the same 
firms for a time period long enough to be analysed statistically, the pooled regression is 
the correct method. Moreover, the pooled regression method increases the number of 
observation for our population of interest, which allows us to get more precise estimators 
and test statistics with more power. A test with more power means that the statistical test 
will be better at rejecting the null hypothesis, no incidence of payroll taxes, when it is 
false. This result relies on the assumption that the relationship between the negotiated 
growth in base wage and at least some of the independent variables remains constant over 
time.33 
3.2 The results for Quebec 
In this section we will present the results for Quebec’s labour market. First we will 
present and analyse table 3, which summarizes the results obtained when we express the 
payroll taxes in their level form. Secondly we will present and analyse table 4, which 
summarize the results obtained when we express the payroll taxes in rate of change. 
                                                            
33 Wooldridge (2006) 
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 Table 3       
The Incidence of payroll taxes, Quebec labour market, 1985-2007.      
Negotiated wage growth as the dependent variable. The payroll taxes are expressed in their level form.*   
  (1)                  
(1985-2003) 
(2)            
(1985-2003) 
(3)                  
(1985-2003) 
(4)                  
(1985-2007) 
(5)                  
(1985-2007) 
(6)                    
(1985-2007) 
Constant 3,473 5,552 11,225 11,494 11,224 11,229 
 (2,16) (3,45) (9,53) (11,90) (10,17) (12,43) 
       
General payroll tax -0,178 -0,248 -0,501 -0,567 -0,515 -0,561 
 (1,61) (2,04) (6,37) (7,57) (7,85) (8,86) 
       
Firm-specific payroll tax 0,011 -0,002 0,054 0,044 0,062 0,054 
 (0,22) (0,05) (1,09) (0,90) (1,72) (1,50) 
       
Inflation in the CPI 0,254 - 0,197 - 0,186 - 
 (5,86)  (4,54)  (4,70)  
       
Inflation in the CPI2 - 0,028 - 0,020 - 0,021 
  (4,51)  (3,65)  (3,92) 
       
Cost of living agreements -0,710 -0,716 -0,658 -0,658 -0,676 -0,671 
 (4,50) (4,51) (4,12) (4,08) (4,91) (4,83) 
       
Vacancies 0,014 - - - - - 
 (4,80)      
       
Vacancies2 - 5,970E-05 - - - - 
  (4,82)     
       
Unemployment - - -0,206 - -0,206 - 
   (5,41)  (6,25)  
       
Unemployment2 - - - -0,011 - -0,011 
    (6,43)  (7,60) 
Omitted sector is                        
Food and beverages       
Construction  -1,378 -1,160 -1,806 -1,661 -1,540 -1,408 
 (2,07) (1,75) (2,61) (2,44) (2,54) (2,37) 
       
Textile, clothing and leather  -0,839 -0,873 -0,744 -0,772 -0,603 -0,632 
 (2,86) (2,96) (2,53) (2,61) (2,26) (2,35) 
       
Wood products, paper and printing -0,571 -0,485 -0,670 -0,625 -0,598 -0,557 
 (2,39) (1,99) (2,73) (2,53) (2,64) (2,45) 
       
Petroleum, coal and chemical 
products  -0,479 -0,534 -0,308 -0,344 -0,055 -0,092 
  (1,35) (1,56) (0,82) (0,92) (0,16) (0,27) 
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  (1)                  
(1985-2003) 
(2)            
(1985-2003) 
(3)                  
(1985-2003) 
(4)                  
(1985-2007) 
(5)                  
(1985-2007) 
(6)                  
(1985-2007) 
Plastics and rubber products  -1,311 -1,281 -1,231 -1,225 -1,016 -1,003 
 (3,81) (3,71) (3,65) (3,64) (3,55) (3,52) 
       
Non-metallic mineral products -1,020 -0,991 -1,055 -1,043 -0,795 -0,789 
 (2,61) (2,53) (2,56) (2,55) (2,06) (2,04) 
       
Primary metals -0,628 -0,578 -0,632 -0,613 -0,291 -0,282 
 (2,18) (2,03) (2,16) (2,09) (1,14) (1,10) 
       
Metal products -1,156 -1,113 -1,155 -1,176 -0,710 -0,737 
 (1,89) (1,81) (1,88) (1,90) (1,21) (1,26) 
       
Machinery 0,044 0,080 -0,019 0,014 -0,115 -0,117 
 (0,22) (0,41) (0,09) (0,07) (0,43) (0,43) 
       
Computer and electronic -0,723 -0,855 -0,514 -0,596 -0,374 -0,451 
 (1,90) (2,25) (1,32) (1,53) (1,12) (1,35) 
       
Electrical equipment and appliances -0,981 -1,057 -0,796 -0,873 -0,578 -0,646 
 (2,07) (2,24) (1,75) (1,94) (1,56) (1,76) 
       
Transportation equipment -0,400 -0,402 -0,362 -0,371 -0,192 -0,200 
 (1,53) (1,54) (1,35) (1,38) (0,79) (0,83) 
       
Wholesaler and distributors -0,751 -0,810 -0,661 -0,727 -0,346 -0,397 
 (1,97) (2,13) (1,71) (1,87) (1,06) (1,21) 
       
Grocery stores -2,087 -2,074 -1,990 -1,993 -1,811 -1,806 
 (3,74) (3,62) (3,50) (3,45) (3,29) (3,25) 
       
Transports -1,115 -1,029 -1,215 -1,150 -1,038 -0,964 
 (1,75) (1,58) (1,89) (1,77) (1,82) (1,68) 
       
Broadcasting and 
telecommunications -0,410 -0,411 -0,275 -0,297 -0,248 -0,274 
 (0,70) (0,70) (0,47) (0,50) (0,57) (0,63) 
       
Administrative and support services -0,473 -0,624 -0,296 -0,403 -0,116 -0,210 
 (0,69) (0,91) (0,46) (0,63) (0,21) (0,38) 
       
Accommodation services 0,376 0,343 0,451 0,400 0,618 0,592 
 (1,01) (0,90) (1,23) (1,10) (2,06) (1,97) 
       
R2  0,430 0,420 0,423 0,421 0,409 0,408 
N 493 493 493 493 581 581 
* t-statistics are in parentheses. Eicker-White robust standard errors were used to correct for heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 3 above shows the results for the Quebec labour market when the payroll taxes are 
expressed in their level form. Column (1) shows the results for the estimation of equation 
1, while column (2) show the results for the estimation of equation 1 when the variables 
CPI2 and Vacancies2 are used instead of CPI and Vacancies. The columns (1) and (2) only 
use the data from 1985-2003.  
Column (3) shows the results for the estimation of equation 2, while column (4) show the 
results for the estimation of equation 2 when the variables CPI2 and Unemployment2 are 
used instead of CPI and Unemployment2. The columns (3) and (4) only use the data for 
the 1985-2003 period, allowing us to ascertain the impact of this change in variable. 
Columns (5) and (6) respectively estimate the same equation than the columns (3) and (4) 
but use the full data set for the 1985-2007 period. 
 
If we first focus our analysis on the coefficient of the payroll tax variable obtained in the 
six columns, we find that the incidence of general payroll tax is negative as expected and 
significant in five of the six cases. On the other hand, the incidence of firm-specific 
payroll tax is positive in five of the six cases, but is not statistically significant. As argued 
in section 1, the coefficient of firm-specific payroll tax can be positive because of the 
combined effects on wage of both a downward effect due to the tax rate increase and an 
upward effect due to the higher risk premiums asked by employees.  
 
Thus estimates for the Quebec labour market show that an increase in general payroll tax 
is partially transferred to workers through lower wages. In particular, the estimates of the 
incidence of general payroll taxes on wage are -0.178 and -0.248 when the variable 
Vacancies is used. These findings suggest that after one year more than 1/4 of a one 
percentage point increase in general payroll tax is transferred to workers through lower 
private earnings. Moreover, the estimates of the incidence of general payroll taxes on 
wages are respectively -0.501, -0.567, -0.515 and -0.561 when the variable 
Unemployment is used. These findings suggest that after one year more than 1/2 of a one 
percentage point increase in general payroll tax is transferred to workers.  
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These findings are pretty similar to those obtained in Holmlund (1983), who used time 
series regression and found incidence of -0.462 and -0.492 after 1 year. The coefficient of 
the rate of change in the consumer price index, variable CPI, is positive and significant in 
all cases.  
 
The coefficient of the short-term demand of labour, variable Vacancies, is positive but 
not significant while the coefficient of the unemployment variable is negative and 
significant as expected.  
 
Finally, the industries dichotomous variables are either positive or negative as expected. 
Since we used pooled regression to measure the incidence of payroll taxes, we needed to 
test for the presence of heteroskedasticity which is frequently encountered in cross-
sectional analysis. The Breusch-Pagan test was conducted and the F-statistics suggested 
the presence of heteroskedasticity in the model. The White robust standard errors were 
used to correct for heteroskedasticity and thus obtain valid statistical tests.  
 
In second part of the analysis for the Quebec labour market the payroll taxes were 
expressed in rate of change to see if this approach could confirm the findings shown in 
table 3. 
 
34 
 
 
Table 4       
The Incidence of payroll taxes, Quebec labour market, 1985-2007.      
Negociated wage growth as the dependent variable. The payroll taxes are expressed in rate of change.*   
  (1)                  
(1985-2003) 
(2)            
(1985-2003) 
(3)                  
(1985-2003) 
(4)                  
(1985-2007) 
(5)                  
(1985-2007) 
(6)                   
(1985-2007) 
Constant 0,655 1,994 4,261 4,449 3,167 3,687 
 (2,37) (9,30) (7,59) (12,65) (6,93) (12,20) 
       
General payroll tax 0,001 0,002 -0,006 0,019 -0,014 0,011 
 (0,07) (0,10) (0,28) (0,86) (0,68) (0,50) 
       
Firm-specific payroll tax -0,015 -0,016 -0,004 -0,002 -0,003 -0,002 
 (4,55) (4,93) (1,12) (0,60) (0,98) (0,55) 
       
Inflation in the CPI 0,252 - 0,450 - 0,465 - 
 (7,30)  (13,02)  (13,63)  
       
Inflation in the CPI2 - 0,033 - 0,056 - 0,059 
  (7,43)  (9,59)  (9,93) 
       
Cost of living agreements -0,670 -0,669 -0,491 -0,452 -0,511 -0,457 
 (4,28) (4,30) (2,98) (2,66) (3,56) (3,11) 
       
Vacancies 0,021 - - - - - 
 (10,05)      
       
Vacancies2 - 9,290E-05 - - - - 
  (12,53)     
       
Unemployment - - -0,178 - -0,104 - 
   (4,11)  (2,96)  
       
Unemployment2 - - - -0,013 - -0,010 
    (6,84)  (5,79) 
Omitted sector is                        
Food and beverages       
Construction  -1,250 -1,186 -1,220 -1,127 -0,678 -0,644 
 (4,10) (3,91) (3,12) (2,81) (2,10) (1,99) 
       
Textile, clothing and leather  -0,764 -0,742 -0,857 -0,862 -0,664 -0,655 
 (2,95) (2,85) (2,90) (2,80) (2,35) (2,22) 
       
Wood products, paper and printing -0,641 -0,557 -0,476 -0,316 -0,331 -0,172 
 (2,88) (2,50) (1,88) (1,19) (1,36) (0,68) 
       
Petroleum, coal and chemical 
products  -0,334 -0,366 -0,058 -0,002 0,233 0,272 
  (0,98) (1,15) (0,15) (0,00) (0,61) (0,71) 
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  (1)                  
(1985-2003) 
(2)            
(1985-2003) 
(3)                  
(1985-2003) 
(4)                  
(1985-2007) 
(5)                  
(1985-2007) 
(6)                  
(1985-2007) 
Plastics and rubber products  -1,474 -1,415 -1,386 -1,295 -1,218 -1,130 
 (4,66) (4,43) (4,41) (4,13) (4,32) (4,00) 
       
Non-metallic mineral products -1,171 -1,182 -1,114 -1,113 -0,821 -0,812 
 (2,97) (2,89) (2,25) (2,02) (1,82) (1,60) 
       
Primary metals -0,695 -0,613 -0,855 -0,844 -0,443 -0,448 
 (2,67) (2,36) (2,95) (2,84) (1,72) (1,72) 
       
Metal products -1,827 -1,729 -1,332 -1,076 -0,698 -0,534 
 (3,25) (3,17) (1,89) (1,45) (1,07) (0,84) 
       
Machinery 0,095 0,120 -0,306 -0,301 -0,293 -0,372 
 (0,47) (0,60) (1,35) (1,25) (1,05) (1,09) 
       
Computer and electronic -0,595 -0,654 -0,723 -0,779 -0,628 -0,686 
 (2,19) (2,47) (2,35) (2,45) (2,05) (2,15) 
       
Electrical equipment and appliances -1,217 -1,227 -1,304 -1,395 -1,075 -1,148 
 (4,04) (4,20) (4,21) (4,98) (3,84) (4,38) 
       
Transportation equipment -0,555 -0,540 -0,446 -0,402 -0,312 -0,283 
 (2,40) (2,31) (1,73) (1,49) (1,30) (1,13) 
       
Wholesaler and distributors -0,665 -0,677 -0,606 -0,653 -0,350 -0,369 
 (2,53) (2,59) (1,96) (1,99) (1,28) (1,27) 
       
Grocery stores -1,799 -1,728 -1,513 -1,302 -1,243 -1,007 
 (3,30) (3,02) (2,78) (2,27) (2,31) (1,79) 
       
Transports -1,061 -0,999 -0,761 -0,548 -0,495 -0,308 
 (1,78) (1,65) (1,24) (0,85) (0,96) (0,58) 
       
Broadcasting and 
telecommunications -0,902 -0,854 -0,968 -0,937 -0,847 -0,852 
 (1,77) (1,66) (1,60) (1,49) (1,95) (1,91) 
       
Administrative and support services -1,232 -1,304 -1,055 -1,171 -0,798 -0,900 
 (3,45) (3,64) (2,54) (2,76) (2,08) (2,29) 
       
Accommodation services 0,472 0,526 0,465 0,487 0,562 0,607 
 (1,27) (1,37) (1,13) (1,14) (1,58) (1,64) 
       
R2  0,501 0,500 0,410 0,376 0,371 0,337 
N 459 459 459 459 547 547 
* t-statistics are in parentheses. Eicker-White robust standard errors were used to correct for heteroskedasticity.  
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The table 4 above, shows the results for the Quebec labour market when the payroll taxes 
are expressed in rate of change. The results in table 4 are organized in the same manner 
as the results in table 3. Looking at the coefficient of the payroll tax variable obtained in 
the six columns, we find that the incidence of general payroll tax is negative in four of the 
six cases and not significant in all of the cases. On the other hand, the incidence of firm-
specific payroll tax is negative in all cases and significant when the variable Vacancies is 
used. The negative incidence of firm-specific payroll tax suggest that the downward 
effect of an increase of firm-specific tax exceeds the upward effect on wage due to the 
higher risk premiums asked by employees. On theoretical ground this results is definitely 
possible as we argued in section 1. However these findings contradict the estimated 
incidence of firm-specific payroll tax found in Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990). In 
Vaillancourt and Marceau (1990) the authors found a positive and significant incidence 
for the firm-specific payroll tax. Since there is no theoretical reason to believe that either 
the downward effect or upward effect should dominate, it is not possible to reject or 
accept the finding that firm-specific payroll tax has a positive or negative incidence. 
Thus, we will keep these results in mind until section 3.3, where we will be able to see if 
the results for Ontario’s labour market confirm the incidence of firm-specific payroll 
taxes measured with Quebec data only. 
 
The variable CPI has a positive and significant incidence as expected. The variable 
vacancies which is a proxy for the short-term demand of labour has a positive and 
significant incidence as expected, while the variable Unemployment has a negative 
incidence as expected and is significant in all the cases. Finally, the industries 
dichotomous variables are either positive or negative as we would expect the negotiated 
wage growth to vary across industries due to their specific labour/capital ratio and other 
industry specific factors.  
3.3 The results for Ontario 
In this section we will present the results for Ontario. First we will present and analyse 
table 5, which summarizes the results obtained when we express the payroll taxes in their 
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level form. Secondly we will present and analyse table 6, which summarize the results 
obtained when we express the payroll taxes in rate of change. 
 Table 5       
The Incidence of payroll taxes, Ontario labour market, 1985-2007.     
Negotiated wage growth as the dependent variable. The payroll taxes are expressed in their level form.*  
  
(1)                  
(1985-2003) 
(2)            
(1985-2003) 
(3)                  
(1985-2003) 
(4)                  
(1985-2007) 
(5)                     
(1985-2007) 
(6)                    
(1985-2007) 
Constant 0,720 2,484 6,744 5,507 7,000 5,651 
 (0,81) (3,10) (8,97) (7,71) (8,71) (8,06) 
       
General payroll tax -0,060 -0,086 -0,271 -0,257 -0,296 -0,266 
 (0,97) (1,38) (5,15) (4,66) (5,94) (5,02) 
       
Firm-specific payroll tax 0,138 0,064 0,284 0,269 0,227 0,204 
 (3,63) (1,73) (5,44) (5,56) (5,76) (4,79) 
       
Inflation in the CPI 0,261 - 0,174 - 0,164 - 
 (3,84)  (2,92)  (2,42)  
       
Inflation in the CPI2 - 0,052 - 0,034 - 0,036 
  (4,81)  (2,92)  (3,16) 
       
Cost of living agreements -1,052 -1,063 -0,995 -1,004 -0,902 -0,913 
 (5,12) (5,16) (5,57) (4,84) (4,87) (4,94) 
       
Vacancies 0,016 - - - - - 
 (6,04)      
       
Vacancies2 - 5,130E-05 - - - - 
  (5,30)     
       
Unemployment - - -0,317 - -0,296 - 
   (7,98)  (8,10)  
       
Unemployment2 - - - -0,018 - -0,017 
    (7,56)  (7,49) 
Omitted sector is Food and 
beverages       
Construction  -0,076 0,288 -0,778 -0,714 -0,349 -0,253 
 (0,26) (0,99) (2,40) (2,05) (1,36) (0,95) 
       
Textile, clothing and leather  0,206 0,186 0,145 0,147 0,224 0,219 
 (0,64) (0,59) (0,38) (0,46) (0,78) (0,78) 
       
Wood products, paper and 
printing 0,341 0,218 0,514 0,485 0,465 0,422 
  (1,18) (0,76) (1,72) (1,70) (1,84) (1,68) 
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  (1)                  
(1985-2003) 
(2)            
(1985-2003) 
(3)                  
(1985-2003)
(4)                 
(1985-2007) 
(5)                   
(1985-2007) 
(6)                  
(1985-2007) 
Petroleum, coal and chemical 
products  0,566 0,362 0,907 0,869 0,806 0,737 
 (2,19) (1,42) (2,41) (3,20) (3,46) (3,18) 
       
Plastics and rubber products  -0,030 0,016 -0,200 -0,197 -0,247 -0,243 
 (0,09) (0,04) (0,57) (0,56) (0,79) (0,77) 
       
Non-metallic mineral products 0,279 0,253 0,207 0,200 0,154 0,136 
 (0,80) (0,74) (0,50) (0,56) (0,47) (0,41) 
       
Primary metals -1,851 -1,637 -2,326 -2,271 -1,866 -1,800 
 (5,17) (4,68) (6,59) (5,93) (5,45) (5,27) 
       
Metal products -0,024 -0,005 -0,164 -0,161 -0,202 -0,203 
 (0,07) (0,02) (0,43) (0,47) (0,66) (0,67) 
       
Machinery -0,515 -0,481 -0,671 -0,655 -0,592 -0,583 
 (1,46) (1,34) (1,93) (1,81) (1,90) (1,86) 
       
Computer and electronic 0,430 0,316 0,660 0,641 0,670 0,621 
 (1,23) (0,94) (1,69) (1,85) (1,99) (1,91) 
       
Electrical equipment and appliances -0,348 -0,448 -0,200 -0,220 -0,278 -0,321 
 (0,91) (1,17) (0,55) (0,57) (0,79) (0,92) 
       
Transportation equipment -0,102 -0,012 -0,396 -0,366 -0,305 -0,276 
 (0,35) (0,04) (1,59) (1,20) (1,20) (1,09) 
       
Wholesaler and distributors 0,362 0,200 0,641 0,614 0,464 0,412 
 (1,01) (0,56) (1,70) (1,67) (1,39) (1,23) 
       
Grocery stores 0,015 -0,123 0,203 0,181 0,043 0,006 
 (0,05) (0,41) (0,79) (0,59) (0,17) (0,02) 
       
Transports -0,835 -0,737 -1,021 -1,008 -0,837 -0,814 
 (1,13) (0,98) (2,26) (1,37) (1,59) (1,51) 
       
Broadcasting and 
telecommunications -0,131 -0,279 0,134 0,115 0,454 0,401 
 (0,12) (0,25) (0,14) (0,11) (0,80) (0,68) 
       
Administrative and support services -0,528 -0,381 -0,816 -0,769 -0,319 -0,282 
 (1,34) (1,01) (1,74) (2,01) (0,94) (0,83) 
       
Accommodation services 0,757 0,675 0,739 0,721 0,771 0,749 
 (2,37) (2,18) (1,94) (2,33) (2,94) (2,93) 
       
R2  0,446 0,447 0,460 0,459 0,451 0,450 
N 1078 1078 1078 1078 1291 1291 
* t-statistics are in parentheses. Eicker-White robust standard errors were used in column (1), (2), (4), (5) and (6)  
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to correct for heteroskedasticity .       
 
Table 5 above shows the results for the Ontario labour market when the payroll taxes are 
expressed in their level form. Column (1) shows the results for the estimation of equation 
1, while column (2) show the results for the estimation of equation 1 when the variables 
CPI2 and Vacancies2 are used instead of CPI and Vacancies. The columns (1) and (2) only 
use the data from 1985-2003.  
 
Column (3) shows the results for the estimation of equation 2, while column (4) show the 
results for the estimation of equation 2 when the variables CPI2 and Unemployment2 are 
used instead of CPI and Unemployment2. The columns (3) and (4) only use the data from 
1985-2003. Moreover, the columns (5) and (6) respectively estimate the same equation 
than the columns (3) and (4) but use the data from 1985-2007. 
 
If we first focus our analysis on the coefficient of the payroll tax variable obtained in the 
six columns, we find that the incidence of general payroll tax is negative all cases, as 
expected, and significant in four cases. On the other hand, the incidence of firm-specific 
payroll tax is positive in all cases and statistically significant in five cases, which 
confirms the findings obtained by Marceau and Vaillancourt (1990). Thus the estimates 
for Ontario show that an increase in general payroll tax is partially transferred to workers 
through lower wages. Since the estimates of the incidence of general payroll tax are not 
significant when we use the variable Vacancies, we will focus our attention on the results 
of the columns (3) to (6), which show the results when we use the variable 
Unemployment instead of Vacancies. These results show that the incidence of a one 
percentage point increase in the general payroll tax has an incidence of -0.271, -0.257, -
0.296 and -0.266, depending on the equation and the period used. These results point out 
to a reduction in wages of approximately one 1/4 of the percentage point increase in 
general payroll tax. The incidence of general payroll tax is slightly lower in Ontario 
which suggests that it would be harder for Ontarian employers to recoup the cost of 
payroll taxes by lowering the wage of their employees. 
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The coefficient of the rate of change in the consumer price index, variable CPI, is positive 
and significant in all cases. The coefficient of the short-term demand of labour, the 
variable Vacancies, is positive and significant in all cases. The variable Unemployment is 
negative as expected and significant in all cases. Finally, the industries dichotomous 
variables are either positive or negative as expected.  
Table 6       
The Incidence of payroll taxes, Ontario labour market, 1985-2007.      
Negociated wage growth as the dependent variable. The payroll taxes are expressed in rate of change.*   
  (1)                  
(1985-2003) 
(2)            
(1985-2003) 
(3)                  
(1985-2003) 
(4)                  
(1985-2007) 
(5)                    
(1985-2007) 
(6)                     
(1985-2007) 
Constant 0,232 1,575 3,204 2,858 2,654 2,615 
 (0,83) (6,29) (6,57) (9,26) (6,94) (11,43) 
       
General payroll tax -0,002 -0,005 -0,008 -0,009 -0,010 -0,011 
 (0,24) (0,53) (0,71) (0,81) (0,93) (1,00) 
       
Firm-specific payroll tax -0,017 -0,017 -0,005 -0,004 -0,005 -0,004 
 (4,01) (4,19) (1,12) (1,03) (1,13) (0,98) 
       
Inflation in the CPI 0,337 - 0,54 - 0,578 - 
 (5,34)  (10,67)  (13,31)  
       
Inflation in the CPI2 - 0,063 - 0,089 - 0,093 
  (7,02)  (12,92)  (15,92) 
       
Cost of living agreements -0,984 -1,006 -0,878 -0,910 -0,785 -0,828 
 (4,58) (4,68) (3,95) (4,11) (3,98) (4,23) 
       
Vacancies 0,018 - - - - - 
 (7,76)      
       
Vacancies2 - 6,380E-05 - - - - 
  (7,28)     
       
Unemployment - - -0,219 - -0,175 - 
   (5,20)  (4,84)  
       
Unemployment2 - - - -0,012 - -0,010 
    (5,40)  (5,30) 
Omitted sector is                  
Food and beverages       
Construction  0,570 0,568 0,623 0,610 0,719 0,689 
 (2,18) (2,18) (2,37) (2,32) (3,48) (3,35) 
       
Textile, clothing and leather  0,188 0,142 0,269 0,215 0,334 0,249 
  (0,60) (0,46) (0,90) (0,73) (1,30) (1,00) 
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  (1)                  
(1985-2003) 
(2)            
(1985-2003) 
(3)                  
(1985-2003)
(4)                  
(1985-2007) 
(5)                  
(1985-2007) 
(6)                   
(1985-2007) 
Wood products, paper and printing 0,068 0,032 0,204 0,156 0,226 0,162 
 (0,23) (0,11) (0,70) (0,54) (0,91) (0,66) 
       
Petroleum, coal and chemical 
products  0,336 0,296 0,249 0,237 0,268 0,246 
 (1,20) (1,06) (0,96) (0,93) (1,26) (1,18) 
       
Plastics and rubber products  0,260 0,262 0,118 0,118 -0,024 -0,027 
 (0,66) (0,66) (0,30) (0,30) (0,07) (0,08) 
       
Non-metallic mineral products 0,215 0,196 0,157 0,139 0,076 0,039 
 (0,58) (0,53) (0,42) (0,37) (0,22) (0,11) 
       
Primary metals -1,562 -1,511 -1,668 -1,606 -1,406 -1,358 
 (4,41) (-4,28) (4,76) (4,61) (4,38) (4,27) 
       
Metal products -0,061 -0,037 -0,195 -0,171 -0,235 -0,229 
 (0,16) (0,10) (0,54) (0,47) (0,72) (0,71) 
       
Machinery -0,467 -0,459 -0,497 -0,482 -0,467 -0,478 
 (1,28) (1,21) (1,39) (1,30) (1,49) (1,47) 
       
Computer and electronic 0,177 0,184 0,229 0,244 0,319 0,300 
 (0,47) (0,51) (0,63) (0,70) (0,94) (0,93) 
       
Electrical equipment and appliances -0,708 -0,704 -0,751 -0,732 -0,814 -0,801 
 (1,83) (1,81) (1,94) (1,87) (2,34) (2,28) 
       
Transportation equipment -0,021 0,001 -0,133 -0,090 -0,171 -0,137 
 (0,07) (0,00) (0,44) (0,30) (0,67) (0,53) 
       
Wholesaler and distributors 0,046 0,009 0,078 0,052 -0,036 -0,070 
 (0,12) (0,02) (0,21) (0,14) (0,11) (0,21) 
       
Grocery stores 0,071 0,036 0,051 0,016 -0,102 -0,142 
 (0,22) (0,11) (0,16) (0,05) (0,40) (0,55) 
       
Transports -0,531 -0,573 -0,610 -0,602 -0,593 -0,564 
 (0,64) (0,68) (0,70) (0,68) (0,96) (0,91) 
       
Broadcasting and telecommunications -0,759 -0,655 -0,889 -0,769 -0,346 -0,251 
 (0,79) (0,63) (0,91) (0,73) (0,63) (0,44) 
       
Administrative and support services -0,598 -0,477 -0,835 -0,685 -0,341 -0,232 
 (1,51) (1,25) (2,07) (1,77) (0,94) (0,66) 
       
Accommodation services 0,635 0,610 0,654 0,609 0,724 0,667 
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 (1,91) (1,87) (2,07) (1,99) (2,79) (2,67) 
       
R2  0,455 0,457 0,432 0,438 0,418 0,428 
N 992 992 992 992 1205 1205 
* t-statistics are in parentheses. Eicker-White robust standard errors were used to correct for heteroskedasticity.  
Table 6 above, shows the results for the Ontario labour market when the payroll taxes are 
expressed in rate of change. The results in table 6 are organized in the same manner as 
the results in table 5. Looking at the coefficient of the payroll tax variable obtained in the 
six columns, we find that the incidence of general payroll tax is negative and not 
significant in all of the cases. On the other hand, the incidence of firm-specific payroll tax 
is negative in all cases and significant when the variable Vacancies is used. The negative 
incidence of firm-specific payroll tax suggest that the downward effect of an increase of 
firm-specific tax exceeds the upward effect on wage due to the higher risk premiums 
asked by employees. The variable CPI has a positive and significant incidence as 
expected. The variable vacancies which is a proxy for the short-term demand of labour 
has a positive and significant incidence as expected, while the variable Unemployment 
has a negative incidence as expected and is significant in all the cases. Finally, the 
industries dichotomous variables are either positive or negative as we would expect the 
negotiated wage growth to vary across industries. Thus the findings for the labour market 
of Ontario are similar to the findings of the labour market of Quebec. However we 
obtained different signs for the incidence of firm-specific payroll tax, a positive sign 
when the tax variables are expressed in level form or a negative sign when the tax 
variable are expressed in rate of change. Thus, we conducted the Davidson-MacKinnon 
test to see if the tax variable should be expressed in their level form or in rate of change. 
The basic idea of this test is that if we have the best specification of a model, the fitted 
values from another model should be insignificant. The results of this test for Ontario 
indicate that the payroll tax variables should be expressed in level form because this gives 
a model than is a better specification of the relations in the data. However, the results of 
this test for Quebec reject both models, thus there is no clear winner. Moreover since the 
variable Unemployment has a more significant effect on wage than the variable 
Vacancies when we express the tax variable in level form, we find that based on our data, 
the best model to predict the incidence a payroll tax increase is equation 2. Thus if we 
look at the columns (5) and (6) of the table 3 and table 5, we find that after one year, a 
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one percentage point increase in general payroll tax reduces wages growth by 1/2 of a 
percentage point in Quebec and 1/4 of a point in Ontario. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper we constructed an original data set of the population of all the collective 
agreements which covered more than 500 employees and were signed in Quebec or 
Ontario for the period of 1985-2007. This data set allowed us to use pooled regression in 
order to measure the incidence of payroll taxation in Canada. Two alternative models of 
the incidence of an increase in payroll tax were used: one model separates the general 
from specific tax and express the tax variables in their level form and second model 
separates the general from specific tax but express the tax variables in rate of change. We 
used the Davidson-MacKinnon test to see which model was a better specification of the 
relations in the data and we found that the tax variables should be expressed in level 
form. The results show that that after one year, a one percentage point increase in general 
payroll tax reduces wages growth by 1/2 of a percentage point in Quebec and 1/4 of a 
point in Ontario.34 The estimations are similar to other estimations of the short-term 
incidence of general payroll tax found in the literature. Moreover, the results show that 
firm-specific payroll tax have a positive but not significant impact on wages growth, 
which suggests that the upward pressure due to the need of a risk premium exceed the 
downward pressure on wage due to the firm-specific tax increase. These results suggest 
that in the short-term, one year, an increase in general payroll tax has a negative impact 
on wage growth and since this impact is less than the amount of the tax these results also 
suggest a negative impact on employment.    
 
Thus the results point out to the existence of a trade off between private earnings and 
social benefits financed with payroll taxes. For future studies it would be interesting to 
use panel-structured data to measure the incidence of payroll taxes to fully exploit the 
variation in time and among the collective agreement. 
                                                            
34 We find similar results when the tax variables are lagged two years instead of one year, and for that  
    reason we only report the impact of an increase in payroll tax after one year. 
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Appendix Tables A1 to A5 
Appendix 1 
Variables definition and sources 
Variables  Definition  Source 
W The negotiated grown in base wage  Human Resources and 
Skills Development Canada 
(Contact: Sylvie Gratton) 
GPT             
(level) 
The sum of the general payroll taxes = 
UI+CPP+HE+CNT (level) 
Finances of the Nation - 
(1985-2007) 
FSPT              
(level) 
The sum of the firm-specific payroll 
taxes = WC (level) 
CSST                      
(Contact: Robert Gagné) 
APT              
(level) 
The aggregate payroll taxes = 
GPT+FSPT (level) 
Idem GPT and FSPT. 
GPT                
(rate of change) 
The sum of the general payroll taxes = 
UI+CPP+HE+CNT (rate of change) 
Finances of the Nation - 
(1985-2007) 
FSPT               
(rate of change) 
The sum of the firm-specific payroll 
taxes = WC (rate of change) 
CSST                      
(Contact: Robert Gagné) 
APT                
(rate of change) 
The aggregate payroll taxes = 
GPT+FSPT                                      
(rate of change) 
Idem GPT and FSPT. 
CPI The average annualized inflation two 
quarters before the collective 
agreement 
Statistics Canada web site  
(CANSIM 326-0020). 
COLA Dichotomous that = 1 if there is a Cost 
of living agreement clause in the 
collective agreement and = 0 
otherwise. 
Idem W 
Vancacies An Index than serves as a proxy of the 
short-term demand of labour X 
(Labour force current year/Labour 
force in 1985). 
Statistics Canada web site  
(CANSIM 277-0002 and 
282-0001). 
Unemployment The average unemployment rate two 
quarters before the collective 
agreement 
Statistics Canada web site 
(CANSIM 282-0001). 
CPI2 CPI2 = CPI^2 Idem CPI 
Vacancies2 Vacancies2 = Vacancies^2 Idem Vacancies 
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Unemployment2 Unemployment2 = CPI^2 Idem Unemployment 
 
I2 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
construction industry and = 0 otherwise. Food and beverages is the 
reference industry. 
Idem W
I3 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
textile, clothing and leather industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I4 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
wood products, paper and printing industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I5 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
petroleum, coal and chemical products industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I6 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
plastics and rubber products industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I7 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
non-metallic mineral products industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I8 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
textile, primary metals industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I9 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
metal products industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I10 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
machinery industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I11 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
computer and electronic industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I12 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
electrical equipment and appliances industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I13 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
transportation equipment industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I14 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
wholesaler and distributors industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I15 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
grocery stores industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I16 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
transports industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I17 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
textile, clothing and leather industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I18 Dichotomous variable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
broadcasting and telecommunications industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
I19 Dichotomous vaiable that = 1 if the collective agreement comes from the 
accommodation services industry and = 0 otherwise.  
Idem W
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Appendix 2 
 
Summary Statistics of the non dichotomous variable (Quebec) 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
W 632 2,80 1,70 -2,20 11,50 
GPT(level) 581 12,61 1,45 10,05 14,33 
FSPT(level) 581 5,08 4,37 0,27 26,69 
GPT(rate of change) 550 2,06 3,44 -2,82 12,86 
FSPT(rate of change) 550 4,17 18,36 -44,89 91,14 
CPI 632 2,82 1,68 -1,20 8,14 
Vancacies 544 111,44 33,83 72,20 184,50 
Unemployment 632 10,74 1,73 6,73 14,05 
CPI2 632 10,7899 11,63 0,06 66,26 
Vacancies2 544 13561,72 8587,45 5212,41 34041,17 
Unemployment2 632 118,3015 37,29 45,29 197,4 
 
Summary Statistics of the non dichotomous variable (Ontario) 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
W 1349 2,87 2,09 -7,10 13,80 
GPT(level) 1291 10,44 1,78 7,40 12,03 
FSPT(level) 1291 4,92 2,58 0,27 10,90 
GPT(rate of change) 1205 2,51 6,48 -4,33 26,54 
FSPT(rate of change) 1205 1,02 11,68 -76,05 86,27 
CPI 1349 3,00 1,63 0,12 5,91 
Vancacies 1136 109,89 43,41 60,31 195,35 
Unemployment 1349 7,39 1,72 4,72 11,22 
CPI2 1349 11,62 10,52 0,01 34,93 
Vacancies2 1136 13958,41 10723,22 3637,51 38161,51 
Unemployment2 1349 57,57 27,43 22,28 125,89 
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Appendix 3 
 
Davidson-Mackinnon test against Nonnenested Alternatives.* 
    
Quebec 
yhat 1(rate of change), 1(level) (4,10) (9,16) No winner 
Ontario 
yhat 1(rate of change), 1(level) (1,67) (9,69) 
Tax variable should be expressed in level 
form. 
*t-statisticsare in parentheses.   
    
    
    
Appendix 4 
 
Summary statistics of the firm-specific payroll tax in Quebec  
Industries Number of collective 
agreements  
Mean  Min  Max 
Food and beverages  65 6,35 3,77 9,52 
Construction 24 18,45 7,83 28,16
Textile, clothing and leather 66 3,41 1,00 5,58 
Wood products, paper and printing 103 8,46 6,55 11,27
Petroleum, coal and chemical products 23 1,97 1,20 3,66 
Plastics and rubber products 27 4,08 2,49 5,64 
Non-metallic mineral products 12 5,68 2,98 7,51 
Primary metals 67 4,55 3,07 9,51 
Metal products 7 3,65 2,43 4,66 
Machinery 2 5,76 4,39 7,63 
Computer and electronic 27 0,89 0,35 1,16 
Electrical equipment and appliances 23 0,89 0,35 1,16 
Transportation equipment 65 3,46 1,56 6,66 
Wholesaler and distributors 29 2,53 1,27 3,56 
Grocery stores 11 2,53 1,27 3,56 
Transports 13 12,32 6,01 17,20
Broadcasting and telecommunications 20 0,66 0,22 1,51 
Administrative and support services 27 0,55 0,27 0,70 
Accomodation services 21 2,90 1,00 4,02 
Total * 632 5,04 0,22 28,16
*Unweighted mean of the firm-specific payroll taxes.    
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Appendix 5 
 
Summary statistics of the firm-specific payroll tax in Ontario  
Industries Number of collective 
agreements  
Mean  Min  Max 
Food and beverages  116 3,87 2,83 5,31 
Construction 377 7,89 5,82 10,90
Textile, clothing and leather 26 4,10 2,05 6,09 
Wood products, paper and printing 65 2,27 1,42 3,26 
Petroleum, coal and chemical products 37 1,40 1,02 2,12 
Plastics and rubber products 40 4,26 3,34 5,57 
Non-metallic mineral products 24 3,30 2,06 5,37 
Primary metals 61 5,81 3,81 8,22 
Metal products 31 3,87 3,13 4,65 
Machinery 38 3,99 2,39 6,86 
Computer and electronic 29 1,61 0,30 4,30 
Electrical equipment and appliances 44 4,56 2,42 8,31 
Transportation equipment 224 4,56 2,42 8,31 
Wholesaler and distributors 31 2,01 1,44 3,27 
Grocery stores 123 2,02 1,29 3,27 
Transports 25 5,47 4,26 6,49 
Broadcasting and telecommunications 6 0,68 0,27 1,32 
Administrative and support services 20 3,80 2,15 6,13 
Accomodation services 32 3,09 2,26 4,26 
Total * 1349 3,56 0,27 3,56 
*Unweighted mean of the firm-specific payroll taxes.    
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Appendix 6 
 
As discussed in section 1.1, the benefit linkage of a payroll tax can have an important 
impact on the incidence of an increase in payroll tax. Thus in this appendix we show how 
the results change when we distinguish the general payroll tax with benefits from the 
general payroll tax without benefits.35 Since the definition of a general payroll tax with 
benefits depends on the extent to which the benefits bought by the tax are valued by the 
workers, in columns (1) and (2), we respectively offer two definitions of general payroll 
tax with benefits. 
In column (1);  
General payroll tax with benefits = Canadian Pension Plan (Quebec Pension Plan). 
General payroll tax without benefits = Employment Insurance + the Health and Education 
(Health Services Fund) + Quebec Parental Insurance Plan + Labour standard commission. 
Firm-specific payroll tax = Workers compensation premium. 
 In column (2); 
General payroll tax with benefits = Canadian Pension Plan (Quebec Pension Plan) + 
Quebec Parental Insurance Plan + Employment Insurance. 
General payroll tax without benefits = Health and Education (Health Services Fund) + 
Labour standard commission. 
Firm-specific payroll tax = Workers compensation premium. 
                                                            
35 This appendix was inspired by a comment made by Nicolas Marceau, professor in Economic at the 
Université du Québec à Montréal. 
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The Incidence of payroll taxes, 1985-2007.     
Negociated wage growth as the 
dependent variable.  
Quebec           
(1) 
Quebec           
(2) 
Ontario           
(1) 
Ontario           
(2) 
Constant 11,136 10,074 6,884 8,410 
 (12,09) (10,85) (9,52) (7,52) 
     
General payroll tax with benefits -0,393 -0,804 -0,202 -0,510 
 (5,76) (5,10) (3,32) (3,85) 
     
General payroll tax without benefits -0,772 0,079 -0,506 -0,162 
 (6,67) (0,22) (6,28) (1,08) 
     
Firm-specific payroll tax 0,048 0,030 0,209 0,140 
 (1,36) (0,83) (4,80) (3,26) 
     
Inflation in the CPI 0,142 0,168 0,084 0,081 
 (3,62) (4,08) (1,21) (1,23) 
     
Cost of living agreements -0,690 -0,698 -0,908 -0,356 
 (5,03) (5,05) (4,85) (8,46) 
     
Unemployment -0,149 -0,230 -0,248 -0,938 
 (3,17) (6,94) (5,86) (5,09) 
Omitted sector is Food and 
beverages     
Construction  -1,358 -1,091 -0,290 0,014 
 (2,29) (1,88) (1,13) (0,05) 
     
Textile, clothing and leather  -0,620 -0,758 0,200 0,173 
 (2,34) (2,83) (0,69) (0,60) 
     
Wood products, paper and printing -0,553 -0,611 0,411 0,292 
 (2,54) (2,85) (1,56) (1,14) 
     
Petroleum, coal and chemical 
products  -0,137 -0,196 0,792 0,594 
 (0,41) (0,58) (3,18) (2,53) 
         
Plastics and rubber products  -1,016 -1,091 -0,220 -0,167 
 (3,45) (3,73) (0,69) (0,54) 
     
Non-metallic mineral products -0,737 -0,790 0,139 0,138 
 (2,07) (2,20) (0,42) (0,43) 
     
Primary metals -0,256 -0,340 -1,818 -1,662 
  (1,01) (1,33) (5,34) (4,94) 
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  Quebec           
(1) 
Quebec           
(2) 
Ontario           
(1) 
Ontario           
(2) 
Metal products -0,772 -0,760 -0,192 -0,215 
 (1,33) (1,22) (0,62) (0,71) 
     
Machinery -0,042 -0,125 -0,563 -0,561 
 (0,14) (0,64) (1,81) (1,84) 
     
Computer and electronic -0,464 -0,582 0,675 0,451 
 (1,38) (1,74) (1,95) (1,32) 
     
Electrical equipment and appliances -0,633 -0,731 -0,291 -0,383 
 (1,71) (1,93) (0,82) (1,12) 
     
Transportation equipment -0,207 -0,282 -0,284 -0,201 
 (0,86) (1,19) (1,11) (0,80) 
     
Wholesaler and distributors -0,372 -0,508 0,424 0,296 
 (1,16) (1,56) (1,25) (0,89) 
     
Grocery stores -1,821 -1,922 -0,014 -0,121 
 (3,39) (3,75) (0,06) (0,47) 
     
Transports -1,027 -0,950 -0,820 -0,666 
 (1,84) (1,68) (1,56) (1,28) 
     
Broadcasting and 
telecommunications -0,333 -0,394 0,421 0,252 
 (0,77) (0,90) (0,72) (0,42) 
     
Administrative and support services -0,188 -0,310 -0,244 -0,192 
 (0,34) (0,53) (0,75) (0,57) 
     
Accommodation services 0,596 0,503 0,732 0,699 
 (1,96) (1,65) (2,80) (2,65) 
     
R2  0,428 0,426 0,459 0,457 
N 581 581 1291 1291 
* t-statistics are in parentheses. Eicker-White robust standard errors were used to correct for 
heteroskedasticity.     
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The variables Inflation, cost of living agreements and unemployment have the expected 
sign and are significant. The general payroll taxes with benefits have a negative and 
significant effect in all cases. On the other hand, the general payroll taxes without 
benefits only have a negative and significant effect on wage growth when the general 
taxes are defined as in column (1). Looking at the column (1) and (2) for Quebec and 
Ontario, one can see that the impact on wage growth is higher when the Employment 
Insurance and the Quebec Parental Insurance Plan are included in the definition of 
general payroll tax with benefits. This indicates that the Employment Insurance payroll 
tax could be easier to shift to workers through lower wages than the Canadian/Quebec 
Pension Plan payroll tax. 
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